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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the value of public information in a Cournot
duopoly where there is uncertainty about the market demand and/or the cost func-
tion. We provide conditions that allow one to determine whether the value of public
information is positive or negative. With every Cournot duopoly in a certain class, we
associate a real-valued function (defined on a convex subset of the positive orthant of
the real plane) whose curvature determines whether the value of public information
is either positive or negative: if this function is convex (concave) then the value of
public information is positive (negative). Using this fact we identified interesting sub-
classes of industries where the value of public information is positive (negative). We
also show the usefulness of our results to determine the value of public information
in specific applications.
There is a considerable literature studying the value of public information in
general equilibrium. Hirschleifer (1971) shows that improving public information
may make agents worse off ex-ante in an exchange economy where agents share risks.
Several papers generalize aspects of Hirschleifer examples — see, e.g., Marshall (1979),
Wilson (1975), Green (1981), Sulganik and Zilcha (1996). In a recent paper, Schlee
(2001) shows that in this context the value of public information is negative in any
economy where there is a representative agent. Contrary to Schlee’s result, in our
context we can easily generate examples of classes of industries for which the value
of public information is positive.
There are also a number of papers that study the value of information in a linear
oligopoly.1 Ponssard (1979) investigates this issue in an industry where there is un-
certainty about the market demand, and where some firms are informed about the
state of nature and other are uninformed. Vives (1984) studies the value of informa-
tion under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in a duopoly where demand is
uncertain. Also in a linear duopoly where firms are uncertain about their costs, Sakai
(1985) investigates the value of information under a variety of information structures.
In studying the value of information in a Cournot oligopoly some difficulties
1In a recent paper, Ottaviani and Pratt (2001) study the value of public information in a
monopoly.
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emerge. Specifically, the associated non-cooperative game with incomplete informa-
tion may not have a unique and/or interior equilibrium. When the game has several
equilibrium points, it is not clear which equilibria to compare. And when equilibrium
is not interior, comparative static exercises are difficult as corner equilibria are char-
acterized by a set of inequalities rather than a system of equations. Moreover, it is
easy to produce examples of industries whose associated game has a unique and inte-
rior equilibrium, for which altering the firms’ information structure by adding public
information leads to a new game whose unique equilibrium is a corner equilibrium
(see Example 3.13 below).
All the papers mentioned above circumvent this problem by directly assuming
that the games associated with the industries under study have a unique and interior
equilibrium, even though it is not difficult to find examples where this assumption
is violated. Instead, we identify a class of Cournot duopolies (not necessarily linear)
with symmetric information for which the game associated to each industry has a
unique interior equilibrium. This allows us to define the value of public information
for any industry in this class, and study conditions under which it is either positive
or negative. In addition, our model of incomplete information does not impose any
restriction of the space of states of nature or on the character of firms’ information.
In particular, our framework allows for continuous as well as discrete information
structures.
There are other topics on information in oligopolistic environments that have
received attention in the literature. Gal-Or (1985, 1986), for example, studies the
incentives for information sharing, and Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) examine
whether information advantages are rewarded in equilibrium. Studying these issues
involves exercises different from those performed in the present paper. Determining
whether a firm may have an incentive to reveal (part or all of) its information to
a rival, for example, requires to compare the payoffs of the firm in two games that
differ in the information of the rival. Or determining whether a firm with superior
information enjoys greater profits requires to compare the profits of the firms in a
(given) game. Our results offer no conclusion regarding these issues.
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2 The model
Consider a duopolistic industry where two firms compete in the production of a
homogeneous good. There is uncertainty about the industry’s demand and the firms’
costs. This uncertainty is described by a probability space (Ω,F , µ), where Ω is the
set of states of nature, F is a σ-field of subsets of Ω, and µ is a σ-additive probability
measure on (Ω,F). (We interpret µ as the common prior of the firms.) Once the state
of nature ω ∈ Ω is realized, the market demand, and the firms’s costs are determined.
Write p : Ω × R+ → R+ for the inverse market demand function, and for i ∈ {1, 2}
write ci : Ω×R+ → R for Firm i’s cost function. The information of Firm i ∈ {1, 2}
about the state of nature is described by a σ-subfield Fi of F ; that is, given an
event A ∈ Fi, Firm i knows whether the realized state of nature is a member of A.
We refer to Fi as Firm i’s information field. A duopolistic industry with incomplete
information is thus described by a collection I = ((Ω,F , µ), p, c1, c2,F1,F2).
We now introduce the following standard definition from probability theory. Let
T be a set. A family {xt}t∈T of random variables on Ω is called uniformly integrable
if
lim
α→∞
sup
t∈T
Z
{|xt|≥α}
|xt| dµ = 0.
We say that a function f : Ω×R+ → R is uniformly integrable if
(2.1) for all x ∈ R+ the function f(·, x) is F -measurable, and
(2.2) the family {f(·, x)}x∈R+ of random variables is uniformly integrable.
Throughout the paper we assume that the inverse demand function, p, and the
cost functions, c1 and c2, of any duopolistic industry with incomplete information are
uniformly integrable.
Let I be a duopolistic industry with differential information. The Bayesian game
associated with I is the collection G(I) = ((Ω,F , µ),R2+, (F1,F2), (π1, π2)), where
for each firm i ∈ {1, 2} the set of possible actions is R+, and its profit function
πi : Ω× R2+ → R is given for all ω ∈ Ω and r = (r1, , r2) ∈ R2+ by
πi(ω, r) = rip(ω, r1 + r2)− ci(ω, ri).
We refer to G(I) as the Cournot game with incomplete information associated with
the industry I. In this game, a (pure) strategy for a firm i ∈ {1, 2} is an Fi-measurable
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function qi : Ω→ R+ whose first and second moments exist. We denote by Si the set
of all strategies for Firm i, and by S = S1 × S2 the set of profiles of strategies.
Let X be an integrable random variable on (Ω,F , µ), and let G be a σ-subfield of
F . We write E(X | G) for the conditional expectation of X with respect to G. Let
G(I) be a Cournot game with incomplete information. A Bayesian equilibrium is a
profile of strategies q∗ = (q∗1, q
∗
2) ∈ S such that for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every qi ∈ Si,
E(πi(·, q∗(·)) | Fi)(ω) ≥ E(πi(·, (qi(·), q∗−i(·))) | Fi)(ω), (2.3)
for almost every ω ∈ Ω. (Our assumptions on p, c1, c2 and on the set of strategies of
every firm guarantee that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and q ∈ S, and for every σ-subfield G of
F , E(πi(·, q(·)) | G) exists.)
Remark 2.1. Equilibrium condition (2.3) requires that at a Bayesian equilibrium
every firm maximizes its (interim) conditional expected profits at every state of nature.
This condition is equivalent to requiring that each firm maximizes its ex-ante expected
profits; i.e., condition (2.3) is equivalent to
E(πi(·, q∗(·))) ≥ E(πi(·, (qi(·), q∗−i(·)))), (2.4)
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every qi ∈ Si.
Proof: Clearly (2.3) implies (2.4). To prove the converse, assume that (2.3) does not
hold; then there is i ∈ {1, 2} and qi ∈ Si such that
E(πi(·, qi(·), q∗−i(·)) | Fi) > E(πi(·, q∗(·)) | Fi)
on some event A ∈ Fi with µ(A) > 0. Define qˆi : Ω→ R+ by
qˆi(ω) =



qi(ω) if ω ∈ A
q∗i (ω) if ω ∈ Ω\A.
Then qˆi ∈ Si and
E(πi(·, qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))) =
Z
Ω
πi(·, qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ
=
Z
A
πi(·, qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ+
Z
Ω\A
πi(·, qˆi(·), q∗−i(·))dµ
=
Z
A
E
¡
πi(·, qi(·), q∗−i(·)) | Fi
¢
dµ+
Z
Ω\A
πi(·, q∗i (·), q∗−i(·))dµ
> E(πi(·, q∗(·))).
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Thus, (2.4) does not hold.
3 The value of public information
In this section we study the value of public information in a symmetric duopoly; i.e.,
in an industry I where both firms have identical information (i.e., F1 = F2 = G) and
cost (i.e., c1 = c2 = c). Thus, a symmetric duopolistic industry I can be described
by a collection ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,G). (For economy of notation we do not repeat c and
G.) We refer to the game G(I) associated to a symmetric duopolistic industry as a
Cournot game with symmetric information.
Theorem 3.1 provides conditions on the demand and cost functions that guarantee
existence, uniqueness, symmetry and interiority of Bayesian equilibria in a Cournot
game with symmetric information. Note the “multiplicative” nature of the uncer-
tainty in demand and cost assumed in Theorem 3.1. The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies
on Amir (1996) for existence and uniqueness, although in order to guarantee the mea-
surability of the equilibrium strategies we have to appeal to Aumann’s Measurable
Selection Theorem — see Aumann (1969). For interiority and symmetry we provide
an argument based on first order conditions for profit maximization.
Theorem 3.1. Let I = ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,G) be a symmetric duopolistic industry. As-
sume that for all (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+, p(ω, x) = α(ω)f(x) and c(ω, x) = β(ω)x, where
α,β : Ω→ R++ are integrable functions and f : R+ → R+ satisfies
(3.1.1) there is x¯ ∈ R+ such that f(x) > 0 for x ∈ [0, x¯), and f(x) = 0 for x ≥ x¯;
(3.1.2) f is differentiable and strictly decreasing on [0, x¯);
(3.1.3) f is log concave on [0, x¯); and
(3.1.4) α(ω)f(0) > β(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
Then G(I) has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (q∗1, q
∗
2). Moreover, q
∗
1(ω) = q∗2(ω) ∈
(0, x¯
2
) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Proof. For every ω ∈ Ω define the two-player game of complete information G(ω, I)
where each player i ∈ {1, 2} set of pure strategies is R+, and its payoff function
σi(ω, ·) : R2+ → R+ is given by
σi(ω, (x, y)) = E(πi(·, (x, y)) | G)(ω),
5
where
π1(·, (x, y)) = xp(·, (x+ y))− c(·, x),
and
π2(·, (x, y)) = yp(·, (x+ y))− c(·, y).
It is easy to check that under assumptions (3.1.1) − (3.1.4) the game G(ω, I) sat-
isfies the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 of Amir (1996) and therefore has a unique
Nash equilibrium, (q∗1(ω), q∗2(ω)). We show that q∗(·) = (q∗1(·), q∗2(·)) is a Bayesian
equilibrium of G(I). We first show that q∗(·) is a G-measurable function. Define the
correspondence E : Ω→ 2R+ by
E(ω) = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ | (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω, I)}.
We show that the graph of the correspondence E is measurable with respect to the
product σ-field G ⊗ B(R2+), where B(R2+) is the σ-field of Borel subsets of R2+. For all
(a, b) ∈ R2+ let D(a, b) be the set
{(ω, (x, y)) ∈ Ω× R2+ | σ1(ω, (x, y)) ≥ σ1(ω, (a, y)) and σ2(ω, (x, y)) ≥ σ2(ω, (x, b))}.
Since for all (x, y) ∈ R2+ the functions σ1(·, (x, y)) and σ2(·, (x, y)) are G-measurable,
and for all ω ∈ Ω the functions σ1(ω, ·) and σ2(ω, ·) are continuous in R2+, then for all
(a, b) ∈ R2+ the set D(a, b) is G ⊗ B(R2+)-measurable. Now, the graph of E is given
by
graph(E) =
\
(a,b)∈R2+
D(a, b) =
\
(a,b)∈Q2+
D(a, b),
where Q2+ denotes the set of duples of non-negative rational numbers. Since the
set Q2+ is countable, graph(E) is G ⊗ B(R2+)-measurable. Thus, by the Measurable
Selection Theorem (see Aumann (1969) and Theorem 1 in page 54 in Hildenbrand
(1974)), there exist a G-measurable function φ : Ω → R2 such that φ(ω) ∈ E(ω) for
almost all ω ∈ Ω. Since for all ω ∈ Ω the set E(ω) is a singleton (because G(ω, I)
has a unique equilibrium), φ(ω) = q∗(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω, and therefore q∗ is a
G-measurable function. Now, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and qi ∈ Si we have
E(πi(·, q∗(ω)) | G)(ω) ≥ E(πi(·, (qi(ω), q∗−i(ω))) | G)(ω),
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for every ω ∈ Ω, and therefore
E(πi(·, q∗(·))) ≥ E(πi(·, (qi(·), q∗−i(·)))),
which by Remark 2.1 establishes that q∗ is an Bayesian equilibrium of G(I).
Uniqueness of q∗ follows from the fact that for all ω ∈ Ω the game G(ω, I) has a
unique equilibrium.
It remains to show that for all ω ∈ Ω, q∗1(ω) = q∗2(ω) ∈ (0, x¯2 ). Let ω ∈ Ω.
We first show that q∗1(ω), q∗2(ω) ∈ (0, x¯). If q∗i (ω) ≥ x¯ for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then
p(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) = 0, and therefore σi(ω, (q1(ω), q2(ω)) < 0, which contradicts that
(q∗1(ω), q∗2(ω)) is an equilibrium of G(ω, I) (because a Firm i can guarantee itself zero
profits by producing qi(ω) = 0). Thus q∗i (ω) < x¯ for all i ∈ {1, 2}. We show that
q∗i (ω) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Assume by way of contradiction that q∗i (ω) = 0 for some
i ∈ {1, 2}.Without loss of generality set i = 1. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for profit
maximization implies
E(p(·, q∗2(ω))− β(·)) | G)(ω) ≤ 0. (3.1)
If q∗2(ω) = 0, then by (3.1) we have
E(p(·, 0) | G)(ω) ≤ E(β(·) | G)(ω),
which contradicts Condition (3.1.4). If x¯ > q∗2(ω) > 0, then Firm 2’s first order
condition for profit maximization implies
E(q∗2(ω)p0(·, q∗2(ω)) + p(·, q∗2(ω)) | G)(ω) = E(β(·) | G)(ω).
And since p0(·, q∗2(ω)) < 0 and q∗2(ω)) > 0, we have
E(p(·, q∗2(ω)) | G)(ω) > E(β(·) | G)(ω),
which contradicts (3.1).
Finally we show that q∗1(ω) = q∗2(ω) < x¯2 . Since 0 < q
∗
i (ω) < x¯ for all i ∈ {1, 2},
the first order conditions for profits maximization imply
E(q∗i (ω)p0(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) + p(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) | G)(ω) = E(β(·) | G)(ω)
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for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore
E(q∗1(ω)p0(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) | G)(ω) = E(q∗2(ω)p0(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) | G)(ω),
and since (q∗1(ω), q∗2(ω)) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω, I), we have q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω) < x¯.
Hence p0(·, q∗1(ω) + q∗2(ω)) < 0, and therefore q∗1(ω) = q∗2(ω) < x¯2 . ¤
Throughout the rest of the section let us be given a probability space (Ω,F , µ). A
symmetric duopolistic industry I is thus described by a demand and a cost function,
and a σ-subfield G of F . Given a market demand p and a cost function c, define the
binary relation º on the family of all σ-subfields of F as follows: If G and H are two
σ-subfields of F , then
H º G ⇔



E(p(·, x) | H) = E(p(·, x) | G ∨H), and
E(c(·, x) | H) = E(c(·, x) | G ∨H) ∀x ∈ R


 . (3.2)
(Here G ∨H is the smallest σ-subfield of F that contains both G and H.)
The interpretation of the binary relation º is simple: H º G if (and only if) the
predictions of demand and cost functions (the uncertain parameters of the industry)
are the same whether the firms information is given by H, or by the aggregate infor-
mation in G and H (i.e., by G∨H). The binary relation º contains that introduced in
Blackwell (1951); i.e., if H is more valuable than G in the sense of Blackwell (1951),
then H º G, but the converse may not hold: If H and G are generated by finite
partitions of Ω, for example, thenH is more valuable in the sense of Blackwell than G
if and only if H ⊇ G — see Theorem 1 in Chapter 4 of Laffont (1989). It is clear that
H ⊇ G implies H º G, and therefore that º contains Blackwell’s relation. However,
it is easy to construct an example for which H º G even though H # G — for an
example of this kind, see Example 1 in Einy et al. (2002).
Now, consider an industry where the market demand is given for (ω, x) ∈ Ω×R+
by p(ω, x) = α(ω)f(x), and where firms’ cost is c(ω, x) = β(ω)x, where α,β : Ω→ R
are F-measurable integrable functions. Then
H º G ⇔ {E(α | H) = E(α | G ∨H) and E(β | H) = E(β | G ∨H)} . (3.3)
Let p : Ω × R+ → R and c : Ω × R+ → R be given for (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+ by
p(ω, x) = α(ω)f(x), and c(ω, x) = β(ω)x, where α,β and f satisfy the assumptions
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of Theorem 3.1. For every σ-subfields G of F consider the symmetric duopolistic
industry I = ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,G). By Theorem 3.1, the Cournot game G(I) has a
unique Bayesian equilibrium, which is symmetric. Denote this equilibrium by (q∗G, q
∗
G),
and the equilibrium profit by π∗G. We say that the value of public information in the
industry I is positive (negative) if for every σ-subfield H of F
H º G ⇒ E(π∗H) ≥ E(π∗G) (E(π∗H) ≤ E(π∗G)). (3.4)
That is, the value of public information is positive (negative) if having better infor-
mation does not decrease (increase) firms’ expected profits.
Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying the assumptions (3.1.1)-(3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1. Define
K(f) = {(α, β) | α, β : Ω→ R++ are integrable and satisfy f(0)α(ω) > β(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω}.
Note that K(f) is a convex subset of L1(Ω,F , µ)× L1(Ω,F , µ). We denote by I(f)
the class of duopolisitic industries of the form I = ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,G) where G is a σ-
subfield of F and p and c are such that there exists (α, β) ∈ K(f) for which p(ω, x) =
α(ω)f(x) and c(ω, x) = β(ω)x for all (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R+. Each industry I ∈ I(f) is
determined by a pair (α, β) ∈ K(f) and a σ-subfield G of F , and can be described
as I = ((Ω,F , µ),αf, β,G). For every (α, β) ∈ K(f) we denote by (q(α,β), q(α,β)) the
unique equilibrium of the Cournot game with symmetric information associated with
the industry I = ((Ω,F , µ),αf, β,F), and by π(α,β) = αq(α,β)f(2q(α,β)) − βq(α,β) the
equilibrium profit. Also we define the function U : K(f)→ R by U(α,β) = E(π(α,β)).
Clearly U(α, β) is well defined on K(f). Define the set M(f) = {(x, y) ∈ R2++ |
f(0)x > y}, a convex subset of R2+, and let the function V :M(f)→ R be given by
V (x, y) = U(x1Ω, y1Ω). (3.5)
Note that V is convex on M(f) if and only if U is convex on K(f).
Remark 3.2. Let (α,β) ∈ K(f). For every σ-subfield G of F we have (E(α |
G), E(β | G)) ∈ K(f) and
U(E(α | G), E(β | G)) = E(πG),
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where πG is the firms’ profit at the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game
with symmetric information associated with the industry ((Ω,F , µ), E(α | G)f, E(β |
G),F).
Proof. Simply note that (α, β) ∈ K(f) implies f(0)E(α | G)(ω) > E(β | G)(ω) for all
ω ∈ Ω. Therefore (E(α | G), E(β | G)) ∈ K(f), and U(E(α | G), E(β | G)) = E(πG).
Proposition 3.3 below is an analog of a well known result in Blackwell’s model.
However, since the binary relationº defined in (3.2) contains Blackwell’s ordering, the
conclusion of Proposition 3.3 is stronger than that obtained in Blackwell’s framework.
Proposition 3.3. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1) −
(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. If the function V defined in (3.5) is convex (concave) on
M(f), then the value of public information is positive (negative) in every symmetric
duopolistic industry I ∈ I(f).
Proof. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1) − (3.1.3) of
Theorem 3.1, and assume that V is convex on M(f). (If V is concave the proof is
analogous.) Let I ∈ I(f). Thus I = ((Ω,F , µ),αf,β,G) for some (α,β) ∈ K(f) and
some σ-subfield G of F . Let H be a σ-subfield of F such that H º G. By Remark
3.2, in order to prove that
E(πH) ≥ E(πG),
we must show that
U(E(α | H), E(β | H)) ≥ U(E(α | G), E(β | G)).
By Theorem 34.4 in Billingsley (1995) we have
E(α | G) = E(E(α | G ∨H) | G), (3.6)
and
E(β | G) = E(E(β | G ∨H) | G). (3.7)
It is also easy to see that
U(E(α | F 0), E(β | F 0)) = EV (E(α | F 0), E(β | F 0)), (3.8)
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for every σ-subfield F 0 of F . Hence (3.6)− (3.8) imply
U(E(α | G), E(β | G)) = EV (E(α | G), E(β | G))
= EV (E(E(α | G ∨H) | G), E(E(β | G ∨H) | G)).
(3.9)
And since V is convex on M(f), Jensen’s Inequality implies
EV (E(E(α | G ∨H) | G), E(E(β | G ∨H) | G)) ≤ EV (E(α | G ∨H), E(β | G ∨H)).
(3.10)
Since H º G, then E(α | G∨H) = E(α | H) and E(β | G∨H) = E(β | H). Therefore
(3.9) and (3.10) imply
U(E(α | G), E(β | G)) ≤ EV (E(α | H), E(β | H))
= U(E(α | H), E(β | H)). ¤
In order to show the usefulness of Proposition 3.3 to determine the value of infor-
mation in a symmetric duopolistic industry we present several applications.
Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)− (3.1.3) of Theorem
3.1. Denote by I0(f) the class of industries of the form I = ((Ω,F , µ),α0f, β,G) ∈
I(f), where α0 is a positive constant number. Thus, in every industry in the class
I0(f) the demand is known with certainty and only the cost is uncertain. Also denote
by I1(f) the class of industries of the form I = ((Ω,F , µ),αf, β1,G) ∈ I(f), where β1
is a positive constant number. In every industry in the class I1(f) the cost is known
with certainty and only the demand is uncertain. Let the function V0 : (0, f(0))→ R
be given for y ∈ (0, f(0)) by V0(y) = V (1, y). Also let the function V1 : ( 1f(0) ,∞)→ R
be given for x ∈ ( 1
f(0)
,∞) by V1(x) = V (x, 1).
Proposition 3.4 provides a criterium for determining whether the value of public
information is positive or negative for industries in the classes I0(f) and I1(f), re-
spectively. The proof of Proposition 3.4 is analogous to that of Proposition 3.3 and
is omitted.
Proposition 3.4. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1) −
(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1, and let G be a σ-subfield of F.
(3.4.1) If V0 is convex (concave) on (0, f(0)), then the value of public information
is positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry I ∈ I0(f).
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(3.4.2) If V1 is convex (concave) on ( 1f(0) ,∞), then the value of public information
is positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry I ∈ I1(f).
Our next proposition establishes that we can determine whether the function V
is convex (concave), by checking whether either V0 or V1 is convex (concave).
Proposition 3.5. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1) −
(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1, and assume that f is twice continuously differentiable on
[0, x¯). The following conditions are equivalent:
(3.5.1) V is convex (concave) on M(f).
(3.5.2) V0 is convex (concave) on (0, f(0)).
(3.5.3) V1 is convex (concave) on ( 1f(0) ,∞).
Proof. Proposition 3.5 follows from Lemma 3.6 below and the fact that V is homo-
geneous of degree one. ¤
Lemma 3.6. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1) − (3.1.3)
of Theorem 3.1, and assume that f is twice continuously differentiable on [0, x¯).
Then sign(Vxx) = sign(Vyy). Moreover, if Vxx(x, y) ≥ 0 (Vxx(x, y) ≤ 0) for all
(x, y) ∈M(f), then V is convex (concave) on M(f).
Proof. We show that for all (x, y) ∈ M(f) the function V : M(f) → R defined by
(3.5) satisfies Vxx(x, y) ≥ 0 if and only if Vyy(x, y) ≥ 0. Let (x, y) ∈ M(f) and let
(q(x,y), q(x,y)) be the unique equilibrium of the industry I = ((Ω,F , µ), xf, y1Ω,F),
and write Q(x, y) = 2q(x,y). Then, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and qi ∈ Si we have
q(x,y)(xf(Q(x, y))− y) ≥ qi(xf(qi + q(x,y))− y).
Therefore, uniqueness of equilibrium implies
Q(x, y) = Q(1, y
x
).
Also the first order conditions for profits maximization imply
1
2
xQ(x, y)f 0(Q(x, y)) + xf(Q(x, y)) = y,
Hence
V (x, y) = −1
4
x(Q(x, y))2f 0(Q(x, y))
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= x
µ
−1
4
(Q(1, y
x
))2f 0(Q(1, y
x
))
¶
= xV (1, y
x
).
Thus, for λ > 0 we have
V (λx,λy) = λxV (1, λyλx) = λV (x, y);
i.e., V is homogeneous of degree one. By Euler’s Theorem
V (x, y) = xVx(x, y) + yVy(x, y),
and therefore
xVxx(x, y) + yVyx(x, y) = 0,
and
yVyy(x, y) + xVxy(x, y) = 0.
Thus x2Vxx(x, y) = y2Vyy(x, y), and therefore sign(Vxx(x, y)) = sign(Vyy(x, y)), and
Vxx(x, y)Vyy(x, y)−Vxy(x, y)Vyx(x, y) = 0. Since the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix
of V at (x, y) are 0 and Vxx(x, y) + Vyy(x, y), then Vxx(x, y) ≥ 0 (Vxx(x, y) ≤ 0) for
all (x, y) ∈M(f) implies that V is convex (concave) on M(f). ¤
The following remark is a direct implication of Proposition 3.5.
Remark 3.7. If the value of public information in every industry I ∈ I0(f) (or
I ∈ I1(f)) is positive (negative), then the value of public information of every industry
I ∈ I(f) is positive (negative).
Theorem 3.8 establishes useful conditions under which the value of information
is positive in an industry. These conditions are essentially the same that Novshek
(1985) imposes to guarantee existence of a Cournot equilibrium. (Condition (3.8.1)
is the main condition of Novshek’s Theorem 3.)
Theorem 3.8. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)− (3.1.3)
of Theorem 3.1. If f is thrice differentiable on [0, x¯) and for all x ∈ [0, x¯) satisfies
(3.8.1) xf 00(x) + f 0(x) ≤ 0, and
(3.8.2) f 000(x) ≤ 0,
then the value of public information in any industry I ∈ I(f) is positive.
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Proof. Let f be a function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.8 and let I ∈
I(f). By Proposition 3.5 we may assume, without loss of generality, that I ∈ I0(f).
Thus the industry I is described by a collection I = ((Ω,F , µ), f, y1Ω,G), for some
0 < y < f(0). We show that V 000 (y) = Vyy(1, y) ≥ 0 for 0 < y < f(0), and therefore
that V0 is convex on (0, f(0)).
Let 0 < y < f(0), and let (qy, qy) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the
Cournot game associated with I. Write Q(y) = 2qy. We have
V (1, y) = Q(y)
2
(f(Q(y))− y).
First order conditions for profit maximization imply
Q(y)
2
f 0(Q(y)) + f(Q(y)) = y. (3.11)
Therefore
V (1, y) = −Q
2(y)
4
f 0(Q(y)).
By (3.8.1) Q(y) is the unique solution to the equation
z
2
f 0(z) + f(z) = y.
By the Implicit Function Theorem Q is differentiable on (0, f(0)). Thus, differentiat-
ing (3.11) we get
Q0(y) =
2
Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + 3(f 0(Q(y))
.
Direct calculation yields
V 000 (y) =
−f 0(Q(y))(Q2(y)f 000(Q(y)) + 6Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + 6f 0(Q(y)))
2(Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + 3f 0(Q(y)))3
. (3.12)
Since f 0 < 0 on [0, x¯), (3.8.1) and (3.8.2) imply V 000 (y) ≥ 0. Therefore V0 is convex
on (0, f(0)), and by propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of public information in every
industry I ∈ I(f) is positive. ¤
The following result is a direct corollary of Theorem 3.8.
Corollary 3.9. Let f : R+ → R+ be a function satisfying conditions (3.1.1)− (3.1.3)
of Theorem 3.1. If f is concave, thrice differentiable on [0, x¯) and satisfies f 000(x) ≤ 0
for 0 ≤ x < x¯, then the value of public information in any industry I ∈ I(f) is
positive.
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We now apply our results to some examples.
Example 3.10. Let f be given for x ∈ R+ by
f(x) = max
(
a0 −
nX
i=1
aix
λi , 0
)
,
where a0 > 0, ai ≥ 0, and λi ≥ 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The function f satisfies conditions
(3.1.1)−(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. Let G be a σ-subfield of F , and for 0 < y < a0 = f(0)
let (q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated
with the industry I = ((Ω,F , µ), f, y1Ω,G). Write Q(y) = 2q(y). Now, we have
x2f 000(x) + 6xf 00(x) + 6f 0(x) =
nX
i=1
(λ2i + 3λi + 2)aixλi−1 < 0
and
xf 00(x) + 3f 0(x) = −
nX
i=1
λi(λi + 4)aixλi−1 < 0
Since f 0(x) < 0 for all x > 0, (3.12) yields V 000 (y) > 0 for all 0 < y < a0 = f(0).
Thus, V0 is convex on (0, a0), and therefore by propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of
information in any industry I ∈ I(f) is positive.
Example 3.11. Let f be given for x ∈ R+ by
f(x) =



(x− a)2 if 0 ≤ x ≤ a
0 otherwise,
where a > 0. The function f satisfies conditions (3.1.1) − (3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1.
Let G be a σ-subfield of F , and for 0 < y < f(0) = a2 let (q(y), q(y)) be the
unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the industry I =
((Ω,F , µ), f, y1Ω,G). Write Q(y) = 2q(y). It is easy to check that the first order
conditions for profit maximization yield 0 ≤ Q(y) ≤ a
2
for all 0 < y < a2. Now, for
all 0 < y < a2 we have
Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + f 0(Q(y)) = 4Q(y)− 2a ≤ 0,
and
0 = f 000(Q(y)).
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Therefore by (3.12) we have V 000 (y) > 0 for all 0 < y < f(0). Thus, V0 is convex on
(0, f(0)), and therefore by propositions 3.4 and 3.5 the value of public information in
any industry I ∈ I(f) is positive.
Example 3.12. Let f be given for x ∈ R+ by
f(x) =



(1− x)3 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 otherwise,
The function f satisfies conditions (3.1.1)−(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1 on [0, 1). Let G be a
σ-subfield of F , and for 0 < y < 1 = f(0) let (q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian equi-
librium of the Cournot game associated with the industry I = ((Ω,F , µ), f, y1Ω,G).
Write Q(y) = 2q(y). It is easy to check that the first order conditions for profit
maximization imply 0 ≤ Q(y) ≤ 2
5
for all 0 < y < 1. Direct computation yields
Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + 3f 0(Q(y)) = (1−Q(y))(15Q(y)− 9) < 0,
and
Q2(y)f 000(Q(y)) + 6Q(y)f 00(Q(y)) + 6f 0(Q(y)) = −60Q2(y) + 72Q(y)− 18,
for all 0 < y < 1. Now, when y approaches 0, Q(y) approaches 2
5
, and thus the above
expression is negative. Therefore by (3.12) we have V 000 (y) < 0 for all 0 < y < y¯,
where y¯ > 0 is sufficiently small that the above expression is negative. Thus, V0 is
concave on (0, y¯), and therefore there exists a subclass J (f) of I(f)such that for any
industry I ∈ J (f) the value of public information is negative.
4 Extensions: Asymmetric Information
We conclude the paper with an example that illustrates the difficulties that emerge
when firms are asymmetrically informed. In this example the Cournot game asso-
ciated with the given industry has a unique interior Bayesian equilibrium, but the
game obtained by adding some public information has a unique corner equilibrium.
Example 3.13. Let (Ω,F , µ) be a probability space, where Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3}, F =
2Ω, and µ(ω1) = 12 , µ(ω2) =
3
8
, µ(ω3) = 18 . Define p : Ω×R+ → R for (ω, Q) ∈ Ω×R+
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by
p(ω, Q) =



80−Q if Q ≤ 80
0 otherwise.
Also let c : Ω×R+ → R be given for (ω, Q) ∈ Ω×R+ by c(ω, Q) = β(ω)Q, where
β(ω) =



20 if ω = ω1
1 if ω = ω2
77 if ω = ω3.
Let F1 = {∅,Ω, {ω1}, {ω2,ω3}}, F2 = {∅,Ω}, and let G = {∅,Ω, {ω1,ω3}, {ω2}}.
Then F1 ∨ G = 2Ω, and F2 ∨ G = G. The unique Bayesian equilibrium of the
Cournot game associated with the industry ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,F1,F2) is (q1, q2) where
q1(ω) = q2(ω) = 20 for all ω ∈ Ω. Also the Cournot game associated with the
industry ((Ω,F , µ), p, c,F1∨G,F2∨G), has a unique a Bayesian equilibrium, (qˆ1, qˆ2).
In this equilibrium we have qˆ1(ω3) = 0, and therefore it is a “corner” equilibrium.
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